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“I’ve been rich and I’ve been poor; rich 1s better.”
- Sophie Tucker
Introduction
Minnesota finances public elementary and secondary education by
means of a foundation aid program. This program, which was developed by
George Strayer and Robert Haig in 1923 to correct educational revenue
disparities among school districts, is designed to accomplish two primary
objectives (Boroson, et al., p. IV-2). The first purpose is to provide ——
equal educational opportunity for all students in the state by means of
“equallzed” revenue raised by the program. The second objective is school
tax neutrality through a combination of applying a uniform tax rate to an
“equalized” assessed tax base and distributing state ald in inverse propor-
tion to district property wealth (Hopeman and Diamond, p. 7).
Under the foundation aid program, districts are guaranteed a mmimum
level (formula allowance) of revenue per pupil unit for their educational
needs. The formula allowance IS set at a revenue level that, m prlnclple,
provides each district with an adequate educational program. Districts
are required to levy a mandated tax rate (basic maintenance levy), and
the state provides the differential between the amount that dlstrlcts raise











The funding formula allocates state aid inversely to district property
wealth. Distrzcts with relatively low property wealth raise a smaller
portion of the formula allowance than more affluent districts and therefore
qualify for more state aid. If all educational funds were allocated on the
basis of the foundation atd formula, each district would have equal revenue
per pupil unit and the program would adhere to the principle that equal ef-
fort deserves equal reward. However, forcing all districts to levy only
the basic maintenance levy would be highly restrictive and perhaps politi-
cally xnfeaslble.
Districts may quallfy for and use several additional levles. Two
of these levles, the referendum and discretionary levies, are examined in
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this study. The discretionary levy may be adopted by a local school board,
subject to refutation by petition and vote of the local cltlzenry. The
discretionary levy is equalized. I)istrlctsthat use this levy are assured
equal revenue per pupil unit for the same tax rate. For the 1979-80 school
year, the discretionary levy was fixed at one-half mill. Districts using
the levy were guaranteed $27.50 per pupil unit. In the 1980-81 school year,
districts may increase their discretionary levy to one mill and will be
assured $64.48 per pupil unit per mill.~/ The size of the discretionary
levy is set by the state, and districts have no choice other than to reject
or adopt it.
The referendum levy is not equalized. Districts adopting this levy
are free to levy an unlunited amount of additional mills against their tax
base and retain all revenue for educational purposes. Some people argue
that allowing supplements to the foundation aid program in the form of these
add-on levies, sometimes called “local leeway”, encourages innovation and
change within the educational system. However, others argue against the
add-on levies due to the variations created in expenditures per pupil among
districts. These differences tend to be particularly large when levies are
not equallzed and not restricted to a specific range of additional mills,
e.g., Minnesota’s referendum levy. Moreover, several states have inval-
idatedtheir educational finance programs that allow for revenue disparities
among districts because they contend that they violate the Equal ProtectIon
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This study examines whether or not the referendum levy generates
revenue disparities among school districts. More specifically, we hypo-
thesize that if the referendum levy generates Inequalities In school finance,
a positive relationship will exist between: (1) district property wealth
and use of the referendum levy; (2) district property wealth and the size
of the referendum levy; and (3) district property wealth and revenue raised
by the referendum levy. The discretionary levy is included throughout the
analysis because, being equalized, it provides a relevant contrast to the
referendum levy. The paper 1s divided into four parts. The fnst section
is a brief overview of the constitutional validity of finance schemes that
allow for revenue disparities among school districts. The second section
discloses the findings of the analysis. The design of the study and varl-
ous tests regardng the referendum and discretionary levles are covered
m this section. The third section Introduces several alternative methods
of power equalizing the referendum levy. This section includes three al-
ternative schemes to demonstrate the consequences of power equalization on
district revenue and state costs. The final section is a summary of the
study.
1/ — Each district with an EARC/pupil unit sufficiently large to yield
more than the guaranteed funds at the stipulated mill rates must
reduce Its discretionary levy so It raises only $27.50 per pupil





The responsibility for selecting and implementing educational finance
pollcy in the United States 1s left primarily to the states. This right was
given to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which
states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively>
or the people.” Since education 1s not explicitly contained in the U.S.
Constitution, the states view their right as an inherent power safeguarded
by the Tenth Amendment. The majority of constitutional cases reviewed by
the U. S. Supreme Court have affirmed this principle.
The Minnesota constitution adheres to the philosophy that education
IS solely a function of the state. Article XIII, section 1 of the state
constitution declares that:
“The stability of a republican form of government depending
mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty
of the Legislature to establish a general and uniform system
of public schools. The Legislature shall make such provisions
by taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and effi-
cient system of public schools throughout the state.”
Moreover, a historical examination of Minnesota Supreme Court cases re-
veals that this principle is upheld.~/ Thus, lt is uniformly recognized
that educational policy makmg 1s a state function.
The issue of whether or not school finance programs may allow revenue
disparities among school districts is unresolved. The critical issue that
remains unsettled is whether educational finance formulas that produce slg-
nlflcant variations in revenue among districts deny dlstrlcts equal protec-
tion guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Brown v. Board of Education
(1954) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that revenue raised by state finance
schemes “must be accorded to all on equal terms”. However, little consensus
exists as to the Ilteral Interpretation of the Judicial “equal”.
In McInn~s v. Ogilvie (1969), the U.S. Supreme Court held that finance
policies that allowed for revenue disparities are not in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that
the method of financing education in Illinois failed to provide each child
equal opportunity for education. The Court presented two reasons for their
decision. First, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the disbursement
of educational revenue solely on the grounds of the educational needs of
pupils. Second, there are no “discoverable and manageable standards” that
may be applled to this issue to form criteria to test its constitutional
~f
The following cases serve to Illustrate this point: State ex rel.
Smith v. City of St. Paul (1914), State v. Delaware Iron Co. (1924),
State ex rel. Board of Education of City of Minneapolis v. Erickson
(1933), and State ex rel. Klimekv. School District No. 76, Otter
Tail County (1939).4
validity. The second point is extremely important to the entire issue.
The “needs” rationale offered by the plaintiff is what the Court rejected.
In fact, some argue that McInnls was not much of a setback for supporters
of the plaintiffs position because “the reality of hope for positive
action from the Supreme Court remains largely a function of the development
of a satisfactory rationale” (Coons, et al., p. 315). .—
In 1970, the California Supreme Court rendered a decision in Serrano v.
Priest that was dxrectly in conflict with McInnis. The Issue set forth in
Serrano holds that the quality of public education may not be “a function of
the wealth of ... (a PUPil’S) parents and neighbors” (Garms, et al., p. 217).
Finance programs that base educational revenue on the wealth of districts
.—
violate the Equal ProtectIon clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However,
the Serrano doctrine applied only to California.
Soon after Serrano, many state courts invalidated their school fi-
nance programs on similar grounds. Minnesota was one of these states.
In Van Dusartz v. Hatfield (1971) a U.S. District Court ruled that Minne-
sota’s school finance program was m violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. U.S. District Judge Miles Lord clearly Illustrated how revenue
raised by the Minnesota program was a function of district wealth. The
funding formula attempted to aid every district by guaranteeing each
$404 per pupil (formula allowance) if its tax rate was at least 20
mills. If a district taxed at 20 mills and did not raise the entire
formula allowance, the state paid the difference. If a district taxed at
20 mills and raised over the formula allowance, It was allowed to use the
excess for educational expenditures. In addition, the formula provided a
uniform grant of $141 per pupil irregardless of district wealth. This
grant only aided those districts that raised over the formula allowance be-
cause the $141 minimum pupil guarantee was included as part of the equali-
zation aid given to districts raising less than the formula allowance.
Hence, the abolltlon of the uniform grant would only hurt the wealthy d~s-
trlcts raising funds in excess of the formula allowance. In Judge Miles
Lord’s words:
“To sum up the basic structure, the rich districts may and do
enjoy both lower tax rates and higher spending. A dlstr~ct
with $20,000 assessed valuation per pupil and a 40 mill tax
rate on local property would be able to spend $941 per pupil;
to match that level of spending the district with $5,000
taxable wealth per pupil would have to tax itself at more than
three times that rate, or 127.4 mills.” (Mazzonl, p. 49).
The plaintiffs withdrew their suit because the legislature was m special
session drafting a new finance program (Collins and Johnson, p. 160).
Smace many state courts were challenging the McInnls declslon, the
U.S. Supreme Court once again considered this Lssue. The U.S. Supreme
Court mvalldated many of the state court decisions, including Serrano,
m San Antonio Independent School Dlstr~ct v. Rodriguez (1973). The Court
rejected the Serrano doctrine as having any effect on federal law, stating
that the issue of equalization in school finance 1s a state matter.5
Since Minnesota has acted on this matter via Van Ihsartz, legal prece-
dent has been established for the state. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court’s
stand on equalization still remains somewhat vague. If the Van Dusartz
decision applles in Minnesota today and If the referendum levy disequalizes
school revenue among districts, there appear to be legal grounds that the
levy should be changed.
Design of the Study
Depending upon specific definltlons, Minnesota has approximately 437
school districts. Of these, 431 districts were used m the analysis. The
remainmg SIX districts were not included because they differed from the
majority of the districts. Nett Lake in St. Louis County, Pine Point in
Becker County, and Winsted m McLeon County were not Included because they
do not operate secondary schools. Secondary students in these districts
are transported to other districts for education. Franconia m Chisago
County, and Prinzburg m Kandiyohi County were not Included because they
do not operate schools. Students in these districts are enrolled in schools
outside their home districts. Finally, Red Lake in Beltrami County was not
included because approximately 99 percent of its property is tax exempt.
The remaining 431 districts were arranged from lowest to highest with
respect to property wealth per student. Property wealth, in this contect,
is defined as the 1979 Equalized Assessed Review Committee (EARC) property
valuatlon. The school district data were obtained from “School District
Profiles”, a Minnesota Department of Education publication. In order to
compare districts, property wealth was divided by a measure of the number
of pupils attending school. The pupil unit measure used in this study M
a part~cular form of 1978-79 Average Daily Membership, which we will call
ADM* . ADM* counts every pupil In kindergarten as z of a daily membership
because they attend school on a half time basis. Pupils m elementary and
secondary schools (grades 1-12) are counted as 1 daily membership because
they attend school on a full time basis. Thus, Average Daily Membership*
for each district is computed by the following formula:
~M*=05K+E+sy
.
where K = pupils enrolled in kindergarten
E = pupils enrolled in grades 1-6
S = pupils enrolled in grades 7-12.
After ranking the districts from lowest to h~ghest, the districts were
divided into 10 classes with equal property wealth intervals. Four distrlcts-
Delavan in Faribault County, Kennedy and Humboldt-St. Vincent in Klttson
County, and Becker m Sherburne County were placed m a special class
(Class XI) because them property wealth was substantially higher than the
other districts. The number of districts in each class IS displayed ~n
~/
ADM* differs from ADM and total pupil units. We used ADM* as a de-
flator because the actual number of pupils In school membership was
desired rather than a pollcy weighted pupil measure, i.e., ADM or
total pupil units.6
Graph 1 and conforms to a lggnormal distribution with a mean EARC/ADM*
of $33,327.
Analysi$’
Relationship Between the Probability of Using the Referendum Levy and
District Property Wealth
The percentage of districts that adopted the referendum levy (1979-80)
was calculated for each district class. The results are presented in Graph 2.
For Classes I to X, a generally positive relationship between property
wealth and use of the levy holds. Class XI is somewhat lower than Class X, .
however, the number of dutricts in Class XI is small (4) and these dis-
tricts differ from others in their extremely large EARC/ADM*. Therefore, one
should be cautious about making generalizations regarding a negative rela-
tion through Classes X and XI. A positive relationship between property
wealth and use of the referendum levy is expected because districts with
relatively higher property values are able to raise more revenue than those
with less property wealth at a given tax rate. With this economic incentive,
more affluent districts should have a greater probability of adopting refer-
endum levies.
In order to confirm these findings by a more rigorous statxstlcal
method, the Kolmogorov Goodness of Fit Test was used. The procedures for
this test are the following. First the 431 districts were ranked according
to EARC/ADM*(Wi) so that WI < W2 ... < W431. For each district, a 1 was
assigned if It used the referendum levy and a O was assigned to it if it did
not. A cumulative distribution function for use of the levy was defined as:
CURj = ( ~ URi)/CU~ for j = 1, 2, ,.., 431
is1
where URi = ‘1 if district
O if district
CUR = 4jl URi.
i=1
used referendum levy
dld not use referendum levy
Under the null hypothesis of no impact of district property wealth on the





function CUR*, adhering to the null hypothesis of no
~/
An unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by Gayden Fisher Carruth performed
independently from this analysls and ent~tled Mnnesota’s Foundation
Program: Projected Effects of the Dlstrlbutlon of Selected Maint-
enanceRevenue Upon Fiscal Equity, For Fiscal Years 1980-1983 arrived
at sunilar results with respect to the referendum and discretionary
levles using different methodology.7
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relationship between district property wealth and adoption of the levy, is
illustrated in Graph 3 along with the CUR distribution. The test
statistic used to measure the discrepancy between CUR and CUR*, as suggested
by Kolmogorov (1933), is the largest vertical distance between the two dis-
tributions (Conover, p. 294). The maximum difference occurs at the 197th
district and is 0.33. The corresponding critical value for a one sided
test (i.e., H : CUR = CUR* H
o A:
CUR < CUR*) is 0.0732 at the 1 percent
slgnlflcance level. Since 0.33 > 0.0732, the null hypothesis of no impact
of district property wealth on the use of the referendum levy is rejected.
ThuS, the Kolmogorov test confirms the initial graphical finding that a
positive relationship exists between district property wealth and use of the
referendum levy.
Relationship Between the Magnitude of the Referendum Levy and District
Property Wealth
In the previous section, it was found that districts with higher pro-
perty wealth have a greater probability of using the referendum levy than
districts with lower property values. However, this is only one of the
determinants of revenue raised by the referendum levy. The other determinant
lS the actual magnitude of the levy. This section addresses the issue of
whether there is a positive relationship between the size of the referendum
levy and district property wealth , using both a graphical approach and the
Kolmogorov test.
The average referendum levy was estimated for each class. The mill
rates for each district were computed by dividxng the total revenue raised
vla the 1979-80 referendum levy by the 1979 EARC valuation. This converted
the revenue into mill rates. A simple unweighed average mill rate for all
districts m each class was calculated. Districts that d~d not use the
levy were included m the average since we are concerned with equity among
all pupils and not only among pupils m districts with levies. The distri-
bution 1s displayed in Graph 4. The general trend supports the hypothesis
that there is a positive association between the size of the referendum
levy and district property wealth. Disparities in the magnitude of the
levy among classes are substantial (e.g., $lasses I and IX).
The Kolmogorov test was again employed In order to give more concrete
support to the intuitive graphical approach. A cumulative distribution
function for the size of the levy was defined as:
cm. = ~;
mi)/cF~ for J = 1, 2, .... 431
J i=1
where MR- = size of referendum levy (mills)
1=1
Under the null hypothesis of no impact of
referendum levy, CMR, call It CMR*, would
dlstributlon, so
district wealth on size of the
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The two distribution functions are presented in Graph 5. Similar to the
Kolmogorov test employed in the previous section, the test statistic 1s the
maximum difference between the two cumulative functions. The maxnnum dif-
ference occurs again at the 197th district and is 0.325. The corresponding
critical value for a one sided test is 0.0732 at the 1 percent significance
level. Since 0.325 > 0.0732, the null hypothesis of no impact of district
property wealth on the magnitude of the referendum levy is rejected. There-
fore, the Kolmogorov test is consistent with the intuitive graphical con-
clusion of a positive relationship between property wealth and szze of the
referendum levy.
Relationship Between Revenue Raised by the Referendum Levy and District
Property Wealth
The amount of revenue each class raises vla the referendum levy
is perhaps the most crucial issue examined in the analysis because it WI1l 5/
reveal whether the levy causes significant revenue inequities among districts.—
The procedure used for estimating the revenue raised per student in each
class by the referendum levy is the following. First the average EARC/ADM*
was calculated for each district class (see Graph 6). These values were
multiplied by the average referendum tax rate for each class (see Graph 4);
recall that the tax rate for each district was computed by the EARC wealth
base rather than the local unadjusted property base. The resulting product
was used as an estimate of the avera e revenue raised per student (ADM*) by
67 The results m Graph 7 demonstrate the referendum levy for each class._
a significant positive relationship between district property wealth and the
amount of revenue per student raised by the referendum levy. On average,
districts in Class IX raise over 200 times as much revenue per student as
districts in Class I. Of course, Class IX has a higher average levy, as
well as a greater percentage of districts using the levy, but If we assume
that all classes tax at the same rate, the results are not drastically al-
tered. Graph 8 shows the positive relationship between property wealth and
revenue raised via the referendum levy when all districts tax at the same
rate. The revenue raised by each class ranges from $17.12 to $144.85 per
ADM~’ . In short, the referendum levy would generate unequal revenues per
student even if taxpayers in all districts chose to tax themselves at the
same rate.
~/
There are several measures of equity in an educational finance context.
Throughout this analysis, equity is defined in the absolute sense. Ab-
solute equity, as Collins and Johnson define It, “corresponds to a simple
notion of equality of educational opportunity: equal expenditures per
pupil”. For other measures of equity, e.g., wealth neutrality and power
equity, see Collins and Johnson, pp. 161-163.
6/ In order to understand the complete process of adopting and implementing —
the referendum levy, consider the following example. Suppose cltlzens
In District A approve a referendum levy In a special election held in
1979. The revenue raised by the levy for the 1980-81 school year 1s based
on property values (EARC) for the 1978 calendar year. Thus, the time
sequence involves a two year lag. When the levy is certified m 1979
payable 1980, the tax base is the 1978 EARC property valuation and the
revenue is applicable for the 1980-81 school term.11
Graph 5
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Relationship Between the Probability of Using the Discretionary Levy and
District Property Wealth
The percentage of dm.trlcts that use the discretionary levy was computed
for each class. A negative or random association between dlstrlct property
wealth and use of the discretionary levy 1s expected instead of the posi-
tive relationship observed for the referendum levy. The rationale for this
behavioral expectation is that all districts are able to raise the same
revenue at equal tax rates. Consequently, use of the levy is neutral with
respect to property wealth. There is an economic incentive for lower
property wealth districts to use the discretionary levy rather than the
referendum levy. The discretionary levy, in effect, Increases the tax base
of poorer districts to a level that 1s higher than they actually have be-
cause it 1s equallzed. On the other end of the spectrum, there is an eco-
nomic disincentive for districts with relatively high property values to
use the discretionary levy instead of the referendum levy. These districts
are forced to lower them discretionary levies to a level where the yield
is equal to the fixed revenue per student. ThuS, one might observe a
slight negative relationship between property wealth and use of the discre-
tionary levy. The data for Minnesota districts are shown in Graph 9. This
graph confirms that a negative relationship exists between district property
wealth and use of the levy. The relationship appears to be smoother or
more consistent than that observed for the referendum levy, but not as pro-
nounced as the referendum levy relationship.
Once again the Kolmogorov test was used to confirm the graphical con-
clusion-. The cumulative distribution function was defined as:
.
CUDj = (; UDl)/CUDN for J =1, 2, .... 431
1=1
where UDl = 1 if district used discretionary levy





Under the null hypothesis of no
of the discretionary levy, CUD,
uniform distribution, so
impact of district property wealth on use
call it CUD*, would reflect an underlying
CUDj* =~ .
The two distribution functions are illustrated m Graph 10. The test statis-
tic, which is the maxunum difference between CUD and CUD*, ls -0.094 and oc-
curs at the 295th dlstrlct. The crltlcal value for a one sided test IS 0.0732
at the 1 percent significance level. Since l-O.094\ > 0.0732, the null hy-
pothesis of no unpact of district property wealth on use of the discretionary
levy is rejected. ThuS , the Kolmogorov test IS consistent with the intui-
tive graphical finding that there is a negative relationship between pro-
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The Kohogorov Goodness of Fit Teet Applied to the Hypothesis of NO Impact of District
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Relationship Between the Magnitude of the Discretionary Levy and District
Property Wealth
The average discretionary levy was calculated for each class. The mill
rate for each d~strict was computed by dividing the total revenue raised
via the 1979-80 discretionary levy by the 1979 EARC valuation. This con-
verted the revenue Into mill rate. However, unlike the procedure used for
the average referendum levy computation, only the dlstri.ctsusing the dis-
cretionary levy were included in the unweighed average at this stage.
Since the discretionary levy is equalized and fixed at $ mill for the 1979-
80 school year, all districts levied % mill or, for the districts with
EARC/ADM* greater than $55,000, levied up to $27.50 per student. Once the
average levy was determined, the rest of the districts not using the dis-
cretionary levy were averaged into each class, thus making the final
averages consistent with the averages computed for the referendum levy.
The results are shown in Graph 11 and seem to reveal a negative relationship
between the size of the discretionary levy and district property wealth.
The Kolmogorov test is needed to determine more rigorously if the relation-
ship is actually negative.
The cumulative distribution function was defined as:
cm. = ( 1 MDi)/CMDN for j = 1, 2, .... 431
J i=1
where MDi = size of discretionary levy (mIlls)
431
CmN = z M-D,.
1=1 1




mills levied for the discretionary levy CMD, call it CMD*, would
an underlying uniform distribution, so
distrxbutlon functions are shown in Graph 12. The test statistic
is equal to -0.099 which occurs at the 295th di~trict. Since we are un-
sure of the dlrectlon of the alternative hypothesis (i.e., positive or nega-
tive relationship), a two s~ded test was used rather than a one sided test.
The critical value for a two sided test is 0.0785 at the 1 percent signi-
ficance level. Since 1-0.0991 > 0.0785 one must reject the null hypothesis
of no impact of district property wealth on the average mills levled by the
discretionary levy. Therefore, we conclude that there is a relationship
between district property wealth and magnitude of the discretionary levy and,
furthermore, the relationship 1s negative. It is important to point out
that the last three classes are primarily responsible for making the rela-
tionship negative under the Kolmogorov test.
Relationship Between Revenue Raised by the Discretionary Levy and District
Property Wealth
The procedure for calculating the revenue per student raised by the














Property Wealth 3.5 1
(1,000’s) L/
class I
Districts in Sach 30
Class



















Iv v VI V21 VIII Ix x x2
77 36 36 28 16 9 8 4
116 2 80.2 75.7 61 7 6.1 5.6 2.0 13




‘L’haXobogorov Goodneaa of Fit Test Applied to the Hypothesis of l?o Impact of Oistrict Property







75 LOO 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 125 350 375 400 425 450
305
Dfatriccs
(in raok ord~r ?ccordinx co EARC/AIPl*)17
discretionary levy for districts using the levy was computed for each
class. The average discretionary levy was then multiplied times the average
property wealth for districts using the discretionary levy in each class.
The local share exhibited a positive relationship between district property
wealth and the amount of locally raised revenue. The state share exhlblted
a negative relationship between district property wealth and state aid.
Next, the remainder of the districts (those that did not use the discre-
tionary levy) were included in the average. The results are presented in
Graph 13. The average revenue raised by each class does not appear to be
strongly related to district property wealth, although there is some indi-
cation of a weak inverse relationship. An equallzed levy neutralizes wealth
and thereby makes educational revenue solely a function of district tax ef-
fort. In other words, any district that uses the discretionary levy at the
same level as another is guaranteed the same revenue per student regardless
of its property wealth.
Summary of the Analysis
There is a positive relationship between district property wealth and
use of the referendum levy. In addition, there is a negative relationship
between district property wealth and use of the discretionary levy. These
results support our hypothesis that districts w1ll be inclined to use the
levy which yields the most revenue per student. More specifically, higher
property wealth districts tend to use a levy that 1s not equalized (referen-
dum levy) and lower property wealth districts are more apt t? use a levy
that LS equalized (discretionary levy). The rationale for thxs is straight-
forward: districts with high property values have no particular incentive
to utilize the discretionary levy because they do not qualify for state
aid (assuming their EARC/ADM* is greater than $55,000) and may raise more
with the unrestricted referendum levy; whereas, districts with low property
values are encouraged to use the discretionary levy because they receive
state aid and thus are able to raise as much revenue as any other district
in the state is able to raise by the discretionary levy.
The magnitudes of these levies are consistent with the above hypothe-
ses. Districts with relatively high property wealth have,on average,
larger referendum levies than less affluent districts. Dlstrlcts with
relatively low property wealth have, on average, larger dmcretionary levxes
than more affluent districts. The rationale for this phenomenon 1s ldentl-
cal to that for use of the levies.
Most importantly, a positive relationship ex~sts between dlstrlct
property wealth and revenue acquired vla the referendum levy. Dmtrlcts
with relat~vely high property wealth not only raise more revenue by the
referendum levy than the relatively poor districts, but also would be able
to raise more revenue by this levy assuming equal taxation rates. In short,
wealthy districts enjoy both hzgher revenue per student and, in some cases,
lower tax rates. This lS not consistent with the United States District
Court ruling in Van Dusartz v. Hatfield.
The revenue per student raised by the d~scretlonary levy 1s not re-
lated to the property wealth of districts. The reason is that this levy is
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for an equal tax effort. In contrast to the referendum levy, the discre-
tionary levy adheres to the Van Dusartz decision and provides an excellent
basis for revision of the referendum levy.
Alternatives to the Referendum Levy
Given the inequitable nature of the referendum levy, what are the al-
ternative policies open to decision makers who desire to change this levy?
One alternative is to do away with the levy. However, this would elimlnate
a major part of the foundation aid program’s philosophy - local leeway.
Equity would be achieved, but at the high cost of a substantial reduction
of district choice in determining their school tax rates. Another alter-
native would be to drop the levy and increase the basic maintenance levy of
the foundation aid program. Districts desiring higher revenues than the
old formula allowance might fmd this appealing. However, this policy has
the same flaw as the first. A loss of district choice would again be the
cost of such a pollcy change. A third alternative is to power equalize
the referendum levy. This would equalize the levy and not necessitate a
reduction of district choice. This section examines the consequences of
power equalizing the referendum levy. Several examples will be discussed
in order to cover a wide range of the possible outcomes of this pollcy.
In order to fully comprehend the results of this alternative policy, a brief
explanation of the mechanics of power equalizing will be outlined prior to
the various examples.
The Theory of Power Equalizing
In recent years, many states have become dissat~sf~ed with their school
finance formulas. The “old” formulas were outdated and, more mportantly,
failed to achieve equity m educational finance. As a result, many states
have turned to the newest alternative - district power equalizing (DPE).
There are currently 24 states employing DPE, or a version of it, to finance
education (Johnson and Collins, p. 334). ~ch of the credit for advancing
the theory of DPE is given to John E. Coons, William H. Clune 111, and
Stephen D. Sugarman, who laid the groundwork for DPE in their boolt,Private
Wealth and Public Education (1970).
The mechanics of DPE are quite sunple. Dlstrlcts are guaranteed equal
revenue at equal tax effort levels regardless of them property valuation.
In essence, all districts have the same property value with respect to
raising school revenue. The state establishes a guaranteed property value
(GV) that all districts apply their school tax rates to. Thus, If a dls-
trlct’s property valuation per pupil is $45,000 and the state’s guaranteed
property valuation is $55,000 then the district IS assured $55,000 times
its local tax rate m educational revenue. More generally, the state and
local shares are determined m the following manner:
Local Share =rxPV





where r = local school tax rate
Pv = district property valuation per pupil
GV = guaranteed property valuation per pupil .
There are two primary advantages of DPE. First, it adheres to the
principle of fiscal equity. Revenue raised by districts is solely a func-
tion of tax effort rather than wealth. This necessarily requires state
aid to be allocated In inverse proportion to district property wealth.
Second, it allows each district the freedom to select its own expenditure
level for education. Consequently, DPE does not violate the concept of
local leeway.
The Consequences of Power Equalizing the Referendum Levy
The consequences of power equalizing the referendum levy are best ex-
amined by considering two key effects of such a policy change. The first
deals with the effects of DPE with respect to equalizing school revenues.
More specifically, how does the distribution of revenue raised by a power
equalized referendum levy (PERL) relate to district property wealth? The
second consequence to consider is the additional cost to the state due to
increased payments in state aid. In this context it 1s important to note
that DPE, in its purest form, has a recapture provision. In other words, dis-
tricts that have property values per pupil greater than the guaranteed
property valuatlon per pupil set by the state must pay the excess of gener-
ated revenues to the state. For example, if a district has a property val-
uatlon per pupil of $65,000 and the state’s guaranteed property valuation
per pupil is $50,000, then if the district decided to levy an additional 5
mills the state and local shares are:
Local Share = 0.005 X $65,000 = $325
State Share = 0.005 X ($50,000 - $65,000) = -$75
Total District
Revenue
= $325 X (-$75) = $250
or 0.005 x $50,000 = $250
However, the provision of recapture is not included in any DPE program m
the United States (Johnson and Collins, p. 334). If recapture is used,
state costs may be drastically reduced (theoretically they may be reduced
to zero). These two effects (equalization and state costs) WI1l be con-
sidered separately.
One reasonable method of developing a PERL schedule is to base it on
the current discretionary levy. The discretionary levy for 1979-80 IS re-
stricted to ~ mill with a guaranteed spending level of $27.50 per pupil.
The proposed PERL schedule would extend the ~ mill limlt to 6 mills, with
each ~ mill earning $27.50 per pupil. Table 1 depicts such a schedule.
This schedule relates the tax level (T) to the guaranteed expenditure
level (E) by the followlng equation:
E = T X $55,00021
Table 1































The guaranteed property valuation per pupil is $55,000. Similar to the
discretionary levy, it is assumed that there is no recapture provision.
Instead, districts with property values per pupil larger than $55,000 are
required to decrease their levy to raise only the corresponding guaranteed
expenditure level.
In applying the hypothetical PERL schedule to the districts classified
by wealth, several assumptions were made. Two different methods were used
in estimating the percentage use (participation rates) of the PERL for
each class. The first method assumes participation rates for the PERL
identical to those observed for the discretionary levy. This assumption is
Justified on the contention that since both levies are equalized, there
should be some correlation between participation rates for both levies.
However, the discretionary levy is lmuted to only $ mill, whereas the PERL
1s extended to 6 mills. Consequently, one should expect a variation In par-
t~cipation rates for the two levies. Moreover, if the PERL is the only means
to raise additional revenue, one should expect to find that higher property
wealth districts would have larger participation rates than they now have
m the case of the discretionary levy. ThuS, the second method assumes
equal use of the PERL by each class of districts.
Table 2 (on page 18) summarizes the calculations performed in esti-
mating the average revenue raised by the PERL for each class. The followlng
outline is a detailed explanation of the methodology.22
a. All districts using the PERL were assumed to levy the maximum - 6
mills (see column 3 in Table 2). The rationale for this assump-
tion is based on the discretionary levy formula. All districts
using the discretionary levy must levy a fixed amount. Therefore,
even though the PERL schedule has different tax levels, for this
example the assumption of equal tax rates was used. However, dis-
tricts in Classes VII through X were required to lower their levies
in order to not exceed the corresponding guaranteed expenditure
level at 6 mills.
b. The PERL was multiplied by the property value, displayed in column 1,
for each class. This intermediate calculation, not presented in
Table 2, yields an estimate of the local share of the guaranteed
expenditure for those districts using the PERL .
c. The participation rates based on the discretionary levy were calcu-
lated and are displayed in column 2. To avoid Introducing much spur-
ious variation these rates (see Graph 9) were “smoothed” in the fol-
lowing way. The participation rates of the first three classes were
averaged to form a single rate for them (46.5%); the participation
rates for Classes IV through VI were averaged to form another single
rate (40%); Classes VII and VIII were averaged giving them a 32%
rate; and the last two classes were averaged giving them an 18%
rate. ~/
d. The participation rates were multiplied by the guaranteed expendi-
ture level, the local share of the guaranteed expenditure level,
and the state share of the guaranteed expenditure level for each
class (see columns 4, 5, and 6). This gave an estimate of the
average for all districts in each class.
e. Average expenditures and state-local shares were re-calculated as-
suming an equal participation rate (40%) for all classes and are
exhibited in columns 7, 8, and 9.
The results of these procedures are shown in Graphs 14 and 15. Graph 14
Illustrates by district class the estimated total, local, and state revenue
raised per student by the PERL. There is a negative relationship between
property wealth and revenue per student raised by the levy. However, much
of this is caused by our assumption of participation rates, which may not
be a realistic premise. Graph 15 presents the revenue distribution when
we assume equal participation rates for each class. The negative relation-
ship between property wealth and revenue raised by the PERL disappears.
ThuS, there is no impact of property wealth on average revenue which im-
plies that the PERL adheres to the fiscal neutrality doctrine. A negative
relationship exists between property wealth and state aid, and a positive
relationship exists between property wealth and local share of revenue
raised by the levy.
Prediction of the actual revenue distribution among classes if the
referendum levy were power equallzed IS impossible. However, the two
~/
Since Class XI did not use the discretionary levy, it was not in-
cluded in this portion of the study.200
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estimation methods provide a good characterization of what would transpire.
Fewer equalizing the referendum levy would allow every district the oppor-
tunity to raise the same amount of revenue that any district in the state
is able to raise at a given tax level. In addition, districts are not re-
stricted to tax at a mandatory level. Therefore, the concept of local lee-
way, which is crucial to the rationale behind the current referendum levy, 1s
not mitigated. Equity is fulfilled by the PERL and not at the cost of
taking away local option.
Adopting a I?ERLis not free of costs, however. As was mentioned
earlier, a PERL would require additional state aid. Since we are not in-
cluding the possibility of a recapture provision, any PERL schedule will
result m increased state costs. However, there are several ways to re-
duce state costs. One way to lower state aid would be to reduce the amount
of the guaranteed expenditure per pupil for each level of effort. For ex-
ample, the schedule depicted in Table 1 could be revised to incorporate
a reduction in the guaranteed expenditure level from $27.50 to $26.00 per
half mill levied, which would be a 5% percent reduction. This would lower
the state’s share of school revenue in two ways. First, the expenditure
level would be lowered by 5% percent which implles that state sld would be
reduced by at least 5+ percent. In effect, the reduct~on in the expendi-
ture level 1s synonymous with lowering the guaranteed property valuatlon
set by the state. Second, with the reduction in the guaranteed property
valuation, districts will raise a higher proportion of the guaranteed ex-
penditure level locally. In fact, some districts that previously received
state ald w~ll, after the reductzon, receive no aid at all. Consequently,
the state pays out proportionately less state aid to districts when the
guaranteed level is reduced. The overall effect is to reduce the state’s
share of the costs by more than the 5% percent reduction. The PERL sche-
dule before and after the 5% percent reduction is displayed in Table 3.
Table 3
Power Equalized Referendum Levy Schedule Before and After the 5%
Percent Reduction in the Guaranteed Expenditure Level
Guaranteed Expenditure per Guaranteed Expenditure per







































Using the same set of assumptions and procedures that were used in
calculating the various revenues in the first example, the results of the
new PERL are illustrated in Graphs 16 and 17. The same comments hold for
these two graphs with respect to equity that were mentioned in the first
example. By reducing the guaranteed expenditure level by 5$ percent the
state costs are reduced, under the first set of assumptions (Graphs 14 and
16), by $5.8 million or 11 percent. Under the second set of assumptions
(i.e., equal participation rates - Graphs 15 and 17) state costs are reduced
by $5.3 m~llion, also 11 percent.8/ This method of reducing state aid is
advantageous because of its simplicity. The percentage reduction in state
costs will always be greater than the percentage reduction in the guaranteed
expenditure level.
Another means to achieve a reduction m the state share of the PERL is
to change the nature of the schedule in a more fundamental fashion. Consi-
der the schedule shown in Table 4. This schedule is identical to the
schedule in Table 1 in the tax level range 0,5 through 2.0 mills. However,
the $27.50 per pupil Increment declines by 5 percent for each G mill incre-
ment after 2 mills. This type of schedule is called a declining district
power equalizing schedule because each additional increase in tax effort
yields decreasing amounts of guaranteed expenditures. In effect, the guar-
anteed property value set by the state declines at higher tax levels. The
major purposes of this kind of schedule are to 1) discourage high tax rates
in school districts and 2) lower state aid payments to school districts
and thus enable lower state tax rates.
Table 4





























8/ — State costs required for implementing PERL as described in Graphs 14,
15, 16, and 17 respectively are: $51.7 milllon, $46.2 million, $45.9
mllllon, and $40.9 mllllon. The state ald was calculated by multiplying
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The procedure employed to estimate revenue per student and share of )







The new schedule would lead to less participation at levels above
2.0 mills since districts are guaranteed less revenue at these
levels than was guaranteed with the linear schedule. We assume
that districts w1ll, on average, reduce their levies by 30 percent
of the difference between the previously assumed (“old”) levy and
2.0 mills (see column 2 in Table 5). The formula for the new
levy is
New Levy = Old Levy - 0.3 (Old Levy - 2.0).
Classes with higher levles reduce their levies proportionately more
than classes with lower levies , which is consistent with the intent
and design of the declining district power equalizing schedule.
Applying this formula to the old levy results m a constant new levy
(4.8 mills) throughout all classes because all classes taxed at equal
rates in the previous example.
The new PERL, estimated in step 1, was multiplied by the property
values displayed in column 1 to determine the local share of the
guaranteed expenditure for those districts usrng the PERL.
The participation rates based on the discretionary levy in column 3
were used as one estimate for use of the declining PERL.
The participation rates were multiplied by the guaranteed expenditure
level (245.50),the local share of the guaranteed expenditure level,
and the state share of the guaranteed expenditure level for each
class (see columns 4, 5, and 6). This gave an estimate of the
average for all dlstrlcts in each class.
Average expenditures and state-local shares were re-calculated
assuming an equal participation rate (40%) for all classes and are
exhibited in columns 7, 8, and 9.
results of the Drocedure are exhib~ted m Table 5 and ~resented &raph-
ically in Graphs 18 and 19. The schedule is successful m equalizing the
1evy. State costs are significantly reduced by $35.3 million in Graph 18
and $31.5 million in Graph 19 as compared to Graphs 14 and 15 respectively.
A PERL will increase the state aid granted to districts lf a recap-
ture provision is not part of the policy. However, a schedule may be de-
vised that reduces state aid to what policy makers feel is an appropriate
level. There are infinite ways to achieve this. The two examples provided
in this section exemplify how such policies may affect state costs. The
important point 1s that the schedule may be adjusted to flt the needs of
the state while preserving local leeway.
Conclusions
This study has examined the referendum and discretionary levles with
respect to their effects on equality in terms of school finance. The
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but also a function of district property wealth. This implies that rich
districts enjoy higher educational revenue per student because they are for-
tunate in possessing higher property wealth. Less affluent districts are
not able to raise as much revenue per student when they tax at the same
rates as wealthy districts. Consequently, the referendum levy does not ad-
here to the legal principle set forth in Serrano and Van Dusartz that the
quality of public education may not be “a function of the wealth of (a
pupil’s) parents and neighbors”. Rather, it should be a function of the
wealth of the state.
The discretionary levy lS not a disequalizing levy. As was illustrated,
there is some indication of a weak inverse relationship between revenue
raised by the discretionary levy and district wealth. The levy neutral-
izes district property wealth and thereby makes revenue per student solely
a function of district tax effort.
There are several alternatives to the present policy concerning the
referendum levy. The levy could be abandoned, but this would take away
the advantage of district choice, i.e., local leeway. The levy could be
dropped and the foundation formula allowance increased. This would equalize
district revenue, but again at the cost of local option. Perhaps the most
appealing alternative, examined here, is to power equalize the levy. This
is advantageous for two reasons. First, it equalizes revenue potential
with respect to wealth. Second, it allows districts to levy whatever is
desired locally. Power equalizing the referendum levy would not be free of
costs. It necessarily requires more state aid, if one assumes that a re-
capture provision is not included as part of the scheme. However, the
PERL schedule may be manipulated to achieve the desired level of state aid.31
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